Joshua Farris asks what you find when you find yourself.
This is a view to which we will return. Most of this part of the dialogue is devoted to the idea that personal identity is a matter of some kind of psychological continuity; this is the view that we will focus on first.
This raises a problem in accounting for sameness of persons over time. After all, you are the same person that you were one year ago, but are not in exactly the same psychological states you were in then.
This suggests that any account of personal identity in terms of psychological characteristics will have to have something to do with similarity over time.
This is the idea which is introduced by the comparison with the river pp. How foolish it would be, when we ask a question about the identity of baseball games, to look for something else, other than the game as a whole, which had to be the same.
The idea that just as rivers are river-stages connected by appropriate relations and baseball games are, e. What the appropriate relations are in the cases of rivers and baseball games. The question of what the appropriate relations might be in the case of persons. To remember -- or, more plausibly, to be able to remember -- the thoughts and feelings of a person who was conscious in the past is just what it is to be that person.
For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances -- I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.
Why apparent memory is not enough for identity: We may suppose them to be sincere, and to really seem to remember it.
But they do not actually remember because they were not at the battle and are not Napoleon. What is the difference between real and apparent memories? The example of the hypnotist.
Why this makes the memory theory of personal identity circular. A reply on the part of the memory theory of personal identity: The experiences themselves cause the later apparent memories in the one case, while the hypnotist causes them in the other. We can say that the [real] rememberer is the one of the two whose memories were caused in the right way by the earlier experiences.
We thus distinguish between the rememberer and the hypnotic subject, without appeal to identity. A way to extend this version of the memory theory to make possible life after death. The problem of duplicates: If God could create one person in Heaven, and by designing her after me, make her me, why could he not make two such bodies, and cause this transfer of information into both of them?
Would both of these Heavenly persons then be me? But then they are not two but one. But my assumption was that God creates two, not one. So either God, by creating a Heavenly person with a brain modeled after mind, does not really create someone identical with me but merely someone similar to me, or God is somehow limited to making only one such being.
Why this reply does not get you very far. This shows that this problem with the memory theory really has nothing to do with life after death. A second possible reply: Why this makes identity and survival extrinsic affairs; why this seems implausible. The example of death by duplication Suppose that you were told that before that point, your memories would be erased and transferred to someone else, and that they would be replaced with false memories.
Would that change your attitude toward the future period of torture? Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.
Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school. How could a proponent of the memory theory respond?
· A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality is a book by the philosopher John Perry. It has been translated into Spanish, Chinese, Persian and leslutinsduphoenix.com://leslutinsduphoenix.com John Perry: A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality The First Night For Perry: identity = numerical identity exact similarity = qualitative identity The Immaterial Soul View • A person is an immaterial soul.
• Person x and person y are numerically identical = x and y are the same immaterial leslutinsduphoenix.com://leslutinsduphoenix.com "Perry's excellent dialogue makes a complicated topic stimulating and accessible without any sacrifice of scholarly accuracy or thoroughness.
Professionals will appreciate the work's command of the issues and depth of argument, while students will find that it excites interest and imagination."leslutinsduphoenix.com · - Personal Identity, Part II: The Body Theory and the Personality Theory Overview.
Two more views regarding the metaphysical key to personal identity are discussed: the body view and the personality view. According to the body view, an individual is leslutinsduphoenix.com by Neusa Facenda April Perry’s A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality gives an example of logical thinking and argumentation.
More than theorizing, this text expresses ways of defending ideas and proving them to be true or more-likely-to-be-true than other ideas. · I have tried reading over and over John Perry's "A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality" in the aspect of the person-stages theory and how its connected in the "right way" and the arguments that leslutinsduphoenix.com://leslutinsduphoenix.com?qid=AAKXhPH.